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cess. A lack of submissions could still result in less invalid patents 
and applications, and it would not have a side effect of bogging down 
the examiner with inapplicable submissions. The Patent Reform Act 
of 2011 requires applicants to submit stronger applications for fear of 
an invalidating third-party submission. This will result in less litiga-
tion and less invalid patents and applications. Small companies should 
not fear opposition from larger companies because the system im-
poses limitations on the number of observations third parties can 
submit. Also, if small companies submit strong applications, they 
should not fear litigation because their patents will be less likely to be 
invalid. 
Although the Patent Reform Act of 2011 's amendment to 35 
U.S.C. § 122 does not fix all of the USPTO examination deficiencies, 
or even be as good as Article 115 EPC, it should still improve USPTO 
efficiency and patent validity. Thus, Congress took a step in the right 
direction by passing the Patent Reform Act of 2011. 
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ABSTRACT 
The First Amendment guarantees the right to free speech-but 
that protection is not absolute. Some speech is banned outright, such 
as child pornography. Other speech is nearly fully protected, such as 
erotic speech. Caught in the middle of the two is obscene speech, 
which can be owned in the privacy of one's home, but cannot be dis-
seminated publicly. 
The line between obscenity and eroticism is hard to pinpoint, and 
varies from community to community. In general, the process of ana-
lyzing whether a work is obscene includes asking whether the content 
violates the community standards of the local geographic area where 
the material was published. Thus, for most media, publishers of poten-
tially obscene content must choose the communities into which they 
publish, or face criminal charges from the least tolerant communities. 
But for online media, the Supreme Court remains undecided whether 
the obscenity analysis should use the local community standard. The 
Court's doubts stem from the Internet's global reach and lack of con-
trol over who receives free online content. For example, if a work is 
nationally-available online, and is judged using the same legal stan-
dard as in other traditional media, any local community offended by 
the content has the power of a heckler's veto to make the publisher 
liable for distributing obscenity. 
This Note explains why the use of a new online technology re-
solves the question of whether local community standards should be 
used to judge online content. Called geotargeting, the technology cre-
ates borders on the previously borderless Internet, which allows pub-
lishers to specifically target geographically localized communities, 
thereby excluding areas where the material might lead to criminal 
charges. This new power to publish potentially obscene materials only 
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to selected communities drastically reduces the constitutional con-
cerns of applying traditional obscenity law to online content. 
INTRODUCTION: "2 GIRLS 1 CUP" AND THE LINE 
BETWEEN LEGAL EROTICISM AND ILLEGAL OBSCENITY 
Indecency, vulgarity, obscenity-these are strictly confined to 
man; he invented them. Among the higher animals there is no 
trace of them. 1 
- Mark Twain 
Generally, most erotic material can be published publicly, given 
certain restrictions. For example, publishing erotic videos of a fe-
male's nude breasts .and buttocks does not amount to criminal sanc-
tions in any jurisdiction as long as basic guidelines of age, location, 
and time are met. 2 In contrast, it is a federal crime to publish obscene 
material in public.3 Unfortunately, there is no clear or consistent 
boundary between erotic and obscene material.4 In some jurisdictions, 
distributing material showing violent and depraved acts may consti-
tute a criminal violation of obscenity laws. 5 But jurisdictions differ 
1 MARK Tw AIN, The Damned Human Race, in LETIERS FROM THE EARTH: 
UNCENSORED WRITINGS, 219, 235 (Bernard De Voto ed., Harper Perennial Modem 
Classics 2004) (1962). 
2 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206, 213-14 (1975) (al-
lowing a nude film to be broadcast where the public may see it, even considering the 
risk to children, traffic, or offended persons); see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 
(1974) (holding that mere nudity is not obscenity). 
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460 (2006) (criminalizing the distribution of obscene mate-
rial). 
4 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (stating that the Court's at-
tempts to define obscenity over the years were "tortured" because it was so difficult to 
land on a definition); William A. Huston, Under Color of Law: Obscenity vs. the First 
Amendment, 10 NEXUS 75, 78-79 (2005) (arguing that attempting to define obscen-
ity is an exercise in futility because definitions are subjective, vary so widely between 
individuals and communities, and are inherently paradoxical, and because imposing a 
rigid definition smacks of tyranny). 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Extreme Assoc., 431F.3d150, 151 (3d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1143 (2006) (finding the publishers of murder/rape por-
nography videos guilty of distributing obscenity online); see also Brief for the United 
States at 7 n.2, United States v. Extreme Assoc., 431F.3d150 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 05-
1555), 2005 WL 6104849 at *7 n.2 (describing the videos upon which the obscenity 
charges against Extreme Associates were based, including porn films that were in-
tended only for sexual gratification and portrayed the extremely graphic rape and 
murder of three women by a serial killer); BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE 
LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION OF SEX AND BELONGING 56 (2007) ("The Extreme 
Associates website describes [one of the videos upon which obscenity charges were 
based] as 'the most controversial movie' in their 'video arsenal': 'A Stunningly Dis-
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about whether it is criminally obscene to distribute material that is 
merely gross.6 Such non-violent videos depicting sickening (but ulti-
mately non-violent) acts may or may not be obscene; it all depends on 
who defines obscenity. And more recently, obscenity is even harder to 
define when it is distributed online. 
For example, consider the online distribution of the scatologically 
themed Brazilian video "2 Girls 1 Cup," a viral video that rose in 
popularity in 2007. The video depicts two women using excrement to 
engage in extreme sex acts, ostensibly for the sexual gratification of 
the viewers.7 Soon after its online release, viewers began recording 
and posting their reactions while watching the video.8 The viewers' 
shocked reactions to the video became so popular that references to 
the "2 Girls 1 Cup" video began to appear in advertisements,9 movies 
turbing Look at a Serial Killer, Satanic Rituals, and the Depths of Human Deprav-
ity."'). 
6 See, e.g., Will Femia, User Generated Failure, MsNBC.COM (Nov. 28, 
2007, 4:58 PM), http://clicked.today.com/ _news/2007 /11/28/4354948-user-generated-
failure (explaining technology, politics, and the 2 Girls 1 Cup reaction vid-
eos); 2Girls1 Cup: The Real Poop, THESMOKINGGUN.COM (Nov. 30, 2007), 
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/revolting/2-girls-1-cup-real-poop (ex-
plaining the history of the 2 Girls 1 Cup creator and 2 Girls 1 Cup media and 
video reactions). 
7 See Hungry Bitches-2 Girls 1 Cup-R33, MFXMEDIA.COM, 
http://www.mfxmedia.com/mfxshop/hungry-bitches-girls-p-596.html (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2011) (selling the 2 Girls 1 Cup video). 
8 Michael Agger, 2 Girls 1 Cup 0 Shame, SLATE.COM (last updated Jan. 31, 
2008, 4:20 PM) http://www.slate.com/id/2182833/ (explaining the "phenomenon" of 
people recording their reactions to 2 Girls 1 Cup); Femia, supra note 6. 
9 Heidi Blake, Coca-Cola Accused of Using Porn to Target Children on 
Facebook, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (July 19, 2010, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/7897706/Coca-Cola-accused-of-
using-pom-to-target-children-on-Facebook.html (reporting how references to "2 Girls 
1 Cup" were used by Coca-Cola's ad agency in an online marketing campaign for Dr. 
Pepper); Vikram Dodd, Coca-Cola Forced to Pull Facebook Promotion After Porn 
References, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (July 18, 2010, 6:51 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co. uk/business/201 O/jul/18/coca-cola-facebook-promotion-pom 
(reporting that Coca-Cola's use of references to "2 Girls 1 Cup" encouraged a 14-
year-old British girl to search online for the scat-porn video); Laura Shunk, Coca-
Cola apologizes for Dr. Pepper's "2Girls1 Cup" Facebook snafu, DENVER 
WESTWORD, (July 20, 2010, 1:13 PM), 
http://blogs.westword.com/cafesociety/2010/07 /coca-cola_pulls_pom-laced_fac. php 
(reporting how references to "2 Girls 1 Cup" were used by Coca-Cola's ad agency in 
an online marketing campaign for Dr. Pepper); Ken Wheaton & Emily Bryson York, 
Quiznos: We Did Not Hop on Poop-Porn Bandwagon, ADAGE.COM (May 19, 2009, 
4:10 PM), http://adage.com/adages/post?article_id=136753 (reporting on the adver-
tisement run by Playboy in which two bikini-clad women perform the similar actions 
as those shown in "2 Girls 1 Cup" while sharing a sandwich, which many viewers 
mistook as a Quizno's advertisement). 
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and television shows, 10 video games, 11 online humor sites, 12 and even 
on tee-shirts. 13 "2 Girls 1 Cup" has been commented on by a number 
of entertainers, 14 and has garnered media attention from well-known 
sources such as Slate,15 VHl, 16 and Esquire. 17 The "2 Girls 1 Cup" 
video remains available online. 18 
Contrast the online success of "2 Girls 1 Cup" with very similar 
scatologically themed videos that have generated criminal sanctions 
when they were distributed through traditional media (such as radio, 
10 Family Guy: Back to the Woods (FOX Television broadcast Apr. 13, 2008) 
(showing Stewie-one of the sitcom's main characters-reacting to 2Girls1 Cup); 
SUPERHERO MOVIE (Dimension Films 2008). 
11 Harwin, Transcript for "The Lazlow Show" on Integrity 2.0 Radio Station 
from Grand Theft Auto IV: Episodes from Liberty City, GAMEF AQS.COM, 
http://www.gamefaqs.com/ps3/933036-grand-theft-auto-iv/faqs/53042 (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2011) (detailing the in-game mock radio show in which the announcer refer-
ences 2 Girls 1 Cup); Ludwig Kietzmann, DiRT 2 Achievement Takes Off-Putting 
Meme Off-Road, JOYSTIQ.COM (Aug. 12, 2009, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.joystiq.com/2009/08/12/dirt-2-achievement-takes-off-putting-meme-off-
road (describing the in-game achievement requiring a player to win two team events 
with the same female teammate);. 
12 2 Girls 1 Cop, ATOM.COM (Mar. 2, 2010), 
http://www.atom.com/funny_ videos/two_girls_one_cop/; Moments Before Cup 
Chicks, COLLEGEHUMOR.COM (Jan. 7, 2008), 
http://www.collegehumor.com/video: 1796348 (showing a parody of behind the 
scenes at 2 Girls 1 Cup). 
13 2 Girls 1 Cup Tee Shirts, ZAZZLE.COM, 
http://www.zazzle.com/2_girls_l_cup_tshirt-235778664 l l 7 482178 (last visited Nov. 
13, 2011) (selling 2 Girls 1 Cup tee-shirts). 
14 John Mayer, 2Guys1 Cup, JoHNMAYER.COM (Nov. 7, 2007) 
http://www.johnmayer.com/blog/permalink/1560 (showing John Mayer's parody of 
"2 Girls 1 Cup," in which he and a friend eat a cup of Pinkberry frozen yogurt); Joe 
Rogan, Joe Rogan Watches 2Girls1 Cup and BME Pain Olympics, YouTUBE.COM 
(Nov. 14, 2007) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZhevNNIBDnQ#t=Om30s (show-
ing former host of Fear Factor Joe Rogan' s reaction to the 2 Girls 1 Cup Video, in 
which he gags, looks away, and nearly leaves the room); A.J. Jacobs, The 9:10 to 
Crazyland, ESQUIRE.COM (Mar. 17, 2008, 2:40 PM) 
http://www.esquire.com/features/george-clooney-2-girls- l-cup-0408-3 (detailing an 
interview with George Clooney in which an Esquire.com reporter shows the "2 Girls 
1 Cup" video to Mr. Clooney, who gags, leaves the room, and says watching the 
video is "like the rodeo-see how long you can last"). 
15 Agger, supra note 8. 
16 Best Week Ever: Moral Bankruptcy, VHl.COM (Vhl television Broadcast 
Nov. 16, 2007) excerpt available at http://www.vhl.com/video/misc/190222/best-
week-ever-full-act-4.jhtml (showing a video of the Best Week Ever and comi-
cally asserting that "moral bankruptcy" had its best week ever due to the viral 
spread of the "2 Girls 1 Cup" video). 
17 Jacobs, supra note 14. 
18 See Hungry Bitches-2Girls1 Cup-R33, supra note 7. 
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television, or mail). 19 For example, Mr. Danilo Simoes Croce, a Bra-
zilian citizen living in Florida, was indicted in 2006 for distributing 
obscene hardcopy videos20 that displayed paraphilic21 acts of cop-
rolagnia, 22 urolagnia, 23 and vomerophilia,24 very similar to those de-
picted in "2 Girls 1 Cup."25 Mr. Croce pied guilty to the obscenity 
charges.26 \ 
What is even more startling is that soon after Mr. Croce returned 
home to Brazil, it was his company that produced and distributed the 
"2 Girls 1 Cup" trailer video, and to date, it appears no one has been 
charged for its distribution online.27 
19 See Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at *7 n.2 (describing the 
hardcopy videos that led to obscenity charges against Extreme Associates, including 
drinking body fluids); see Indictment at 2--4, United States v. Isaacs, 2008 WL 
4346780 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 2:07-CR-00732), 2007 WL 5238823 (listing the titles 
of the hardcopy videos leading to obscenity charges against Mr. Isaacs). . 
20 Criminal Complaint at 3-15, United States v. Croce, No. 6:06-mJ-01337-
DAB (M.D. Fla. Sep 5, 2006), ECF No. I. 
21 See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, at Sexual and Gender Identity Disor-
ders, Paraphilias, Diagnostic Features (Michael B. First ed., 4th ed. 2000) (defi~ing 
the sexual disorder of paraphilia as, "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, 
sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the s~ffering 
or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or other nonconsentmg per-
sons .... ")[hereinafter DSM-IV]; Joel S. Milner et al., Paraphilia Not Otherwise 
Specified: Psychology and Theory, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND 
TREATMENT 384-85 (2008) (defining paraphilia and describing its first use by psy-
chologists as a "replacement for the legal term 'perversion"'). 
22 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 588 (William 
A. Nielson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1934) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY] (defining 
coprolagnia as "[s]exual excitement produced by contact with feces."); see Milner, 
supra note 21, at 395; see also DSM-IV, supra note 21, at 302.9 Parap~lias Not 
Otherwise Specified (listing "coprophilia (feces)" as a form of sexual disorder). 
23 WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 2805 (defining urolagnia as 
"[s]ex excitement associated with urination."); see Milner, supra note 21, at 395 (de-
fining urophilia and urolagnia in their various forms); see also DSM-IV, supra note 
21, at 302.9 Paraphilias Not Otherwise Specified (listing "urophilia (urine)" as a form 
of sexual disorder). 
24 Milner, supra note 21, at 398 (stating vomerophilia is the "paraphilic focus 
" on the regurgitation process" in which another individual is vomited on for sexual 
gratification). . . . 
25 Compare Hungry Bitches-2 Girls 1 Cup-R33, supra note 7, with Cnffil-
nal Complaint, supra note 20. 
26 Corrected Judgment In a Criminal Case at 1-3, United States v. Croce, No. 
6:06-cr-00182-GAP-DAB (M.D. Fla. Sep 5, 2006), ECF No. 108 (ordering Mr. Croce 
to forfeit $98,000 in profits from the distribution of the films, and sentencing h~m to 
time-served plus three years of unsupervised release, provided he leave the Umted 
States and not return). 
27 Both the short video "2 Girls 1 Cup" and the full-length video from which 
"2 Girls 1 Cup" is excerpted are available for online purchase anywhere in the United 
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home to Brazil, it was his company that produced and distributed the 
"2 Girls 1 Cup" trailer video, and to date, it appears no one has been 
charged for its distribution online.27 
19 See Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at *7 n.2 (describing the 
hardcopy videos that led to obscenity charges against Extreme Associates, including 
drinking body fluids); see Indictment at 2-4, United States v. Isaacs, 2008 WL 
4346780 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 2:07-CR-00732), 2007 WL 5238823 (listing the titles 
of the hardcopy videos leading to obscenity charges against Mr. Isaacs). . 
20 Criminal Complaint at 3-15, United States v. Croce, No. 6:06-mj-01337-
DAB (M.D. Fla. Sep 5, 2006), ECF No. 1. 
21 See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, at Sexual and Gender Identity Disor-
. ders, Paraphilias, Diagnostic Features (Michael B. First ed., 4th ed. 2~00) (defi~ng 
the sexual disorder of paraphilia as, "recurrent, intense sexually arousmg fantasies, 
sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the s~ffering 
or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or other nonconsentmg per-
sons .... ")[hereinafter DSM-IV]; Joel S. Milner et al., Paraphilia Not Otherwise 
Specified: Psychology and Theory, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND 
TREATMENT 384-85 (2008) (defining paraphilia and describing its first use by psy-
chologists as a "replacement for the legal term 'perversion"'). 
22 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 588 (William 
A. Nielson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1934) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY] (defining 
coprolagnia as "[s]exual excitement produced by contact with feces."); see Milner, 
supra note 21, at 395; see also DSM-IV, supra note 21, at 302.9 Parap~ilias Not 
Otherwise Specified (listing "coprophilia (feces)" as a form of sexual disorder). 
23 WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 2805 (defining urolagnia as 
"[s]ex excitement associated with urination."); see Milner, supra note 21, at 395 (de-
fining urophilia and urolagnia in their various forms); see also DSM-IV, supra note 
21, at 302.9 Paraphilias Not Otherwise Specified (listing "urophilia (urine)" as a form 
of sexual disorder). 
24 Milner, supra note 21, at 398 (stating vomerophilia is the "paraphilic focus 
" on the regurgitation process" in which another individual is vomited on for sexual 
gratification). . . . 
25 Compare Hungry Bitches-2Girls1 Cup-R33, supra note 7, with Cnmi-
nal Complaint, supra note 20. 
26 Corrected Judgment In a Criminal Case at 1-3, United States v. Croce, No. 
6:06-cr-00182-GAP-DAB (M.D. Fla. Sep 5, 2006), ECF No. 108 (ordering Mr. Croce 
to forfeit $98,000 in profits from the distribution of the films, and sentencing ~m to 
time-served plus three years of unsupervised release, provided he leave the Umted 
States and not return). 
27 Both the short video "2 Girls 1 Cup" and the full-length video from which 
"2 Girls 1 Cup" is excerpted are available for online purchase anywhere in the United 
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So why are some videos considered illegal when distributed via 
traditional media, but are tolerated when distributed online? The an-
swer is linked to the confusion regarding how obscenity law applies to 
the Internet. For most media, jurors draw upon local community stan-
dards to determine if a work appeals to an unwholesome sexual desire 
and is so patently offensive that it should be criminal to distribute the 
work. 28 This "local community standard" is used to judge works that 
are published through traditional media such as books, mailings, radio 
shows, television broadcasts, and telephone messages. 29 For example, 
if a publisher broadcasts an obscene film over the television, at trial a 
juror will apply the community standards of the juror's local geo-
graphic area. 30 
However, for works distributed online, it is unclear whether local 
community standards should be used, and opposing viewpoints exist 
on how obscenity should be judged online. A recent pair of cases has 
highlighted how courts have split over online obscenity.31 The Ninth 
Circuit recently held that because posting content onto the Internet 
makes the content available nationwide, jurors should judge the work 
using nationwide standards for obscenity, rather than limiting them-
selves to the standards of the local community in which the jurors 
live.32 Under that approach, a juror using a nationalized standard 
could protect an obscene work that the local community would have 
otherwise banned (or even ban a work that the local community would 
have otherwise tolerated). 
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit held that when judging 
whether an online work is obscene, jurors should apply a local com-
munity standard as defined by a small area around the place where the 
States. See supra note 7. This is in contrast to the websites that originally hosted the 
other scat-porn videos upon which Mr. Croce's obscenity charges were based. See 
Criminal Complaint, supra note 20, at 3; see, e.g., 
http://www.dragonfilms.eom.br/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (showing the site no 
longer exists). It is also in contrast to other similarly themed websites where obscene 
content was successfully prosecuted. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 
169 (11th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., http://www.maxhardcore.com (last visited Nov. 13, 
2011) (showing a website that has been forfeited to the U.S. Government pursuant to 
an obscenity conviction); see also infra Part III.B. 
28 This is just one prong of the test for obscenity. See infra Part II.A; see also 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The other prongs are whether the mate-
rial is patently offensive or has value other than sexual excitation. Id. Those addi-
tional aspects of obscenity law are beyond the scope of this Note. 
29 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; infra Part II.A. 
30 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; infra Part II.A. 
31 See infra Parts II.B, III. 
32 United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009); see infra 
Part III.A. 
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work was downloaded (similar to the standard used in all other me-
dia).33 Under that local standard, a producer of potentially obscene 
material in Hollywood who makes his content nationally available 
online could be charged with obscenity in Florida, and the jury would 
disregard whether the work would have been tolerated in Hollywood, 
applying only local, Floridian community standards. 
Choosing one standard over the other raises fundamental ques-
tions concerning free speech on the Internet. If local community stan-
dards are used, Internet publishers who make their material available 
" worldwide can be charged for distributing obscene material when 
someone downloads the obscene work in a community where the 
work is not tolerated. 34 However, if national standards are used, some 
communities could be forced to tolerate works they consider to be 
obscene material, while other communities could be required to pun-
ish the distribution of works they consider to be free speech.35 The 
stakes are high because under present conditions, the application of 
either standard will impact someone's use of online media. 
This issue has been presented to the U.S. Supreme Court,36 but the 
Internet's disregard of geographic boundaries paralyzed the Court's 
willingness to decide whether local standards should be applied to 
Internet obscenity cases.37 For older forms of media, the Court previ-
ously decided that local standards were the more reasonable ap-
proach.38 Although the Court noted problems of chilled speech under 
either standard, it felt that the local standard was less chilling because 
geographic controls associated with each medium allowed publishers 
of potentially obscene material to tailor their messages based on the 
d . . 39 targete commumtles. 
33 United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 162-64 (11th Cir. 2010); see 
infra Part III.B. 
34 See Matthew Towns, Note, The Community Standards of Utah and the 
Amish Country Rule the World Wide Web, 68 Mo. L. REv. 735, 740-43 (2003) (ex-
plaining how under a local standard online speech would be chilled by giving the 
least-tolerant community a heckler's veto); see also infra note 141 and accompanying 
text. 
35 See John V. Edwards, Note, Obscenity in the Age of Direct Broadcast 
Satellite: A Final Burial for Stanley v. Georgia(?), a National Obscenity Standard, 
and Other Miscellany, 33 WM. &MARYL REV. 949, 992 (1992) ("[A national stan-
dard] compromis[es] the interests of both the least tolerant and the most tolerant 
communities."); see also infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
I 
II.B. 
36 Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also infra Part 
37 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. 564; infra Part II. 
38 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973); infra Part II.A. 
39 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; infra Part II.A. 
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Part III.A. 
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work was downloaded (similar to the standard used in all other me-
dia).33 Under that local standard, a producer of potentially obscene 
material in Hollywood who makes his content nationally available 
online could be charged with obscenity in Florida, and the jury would 
disregard whether the work would have been tolerated in Hollywood, 
applying only local, Floridian community standards. 
Choosing one standard over the other raises fundamental ques-
tions concerning free speech on the Internet. If local community stan-
dards are used, Internet publishers who make their material available 
worldwide can be charged for distributing obscene material when 
someone downloads the obscene work in a community where the 
work is not tolerated. 34 However, if national standards are used, some 
communities could be forced to tolerate works they consider to be 
obscene material, while other communities could be required to pun-
ish the distribution of works they consider to be free speech.35 The 
stakes are high because under present conditions, the application of 
either standard will impact someone's use of online media. 
This issue has been presented to the U.S. Supreme Court,36 but the 
Internet's disregard of geographic boundaries paralyzed the Court's 
willingness to decide whether local standards should be applied to 
Internet obscenity cases.37 For older forms of media, the Court previ-
ously decided that local standards were the more reasonable ap-
proach.38 Although the Court noted problems of chilled speech under 
either standard, it felt that the local standard was less chilling because 
geographic controls associated with each medium allowed publishers 
of potentially obscene material to tailor their messages based on the 
targeted communities. 39 
33 United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 162-64 (11th Cir. 2010); see 
infra Part III.B. 
34 See Matthew Towns, Note, The Community Standards of Utah and the 
Amish Country Rule the World Wide Web, 68 Mo. L. REv. 735, 740-43 (2003) (ex-
plaining how under a local standard online speech would be chilled by giving the 
least-tolerant community a heckler's veto); see also infra note 141 and accompanying 
text. 
35 See John V. Edwards, Note, Obscenity in the Age of Direct Broadcast 
Satellite: A Final Burial for Stanley v. Georgia(?), a National Obscenity Standard, 
and Other Miscellany, 33 WM. & MARYL. REv. 949, 992 (1992) ("[A national stan-
dard] compromis[es] the interests of both the least tolerant and the most tolerant 
communities."); see also infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
I 
II.B. 
36 Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also infra Part 
37 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. 564; infra Part II. 
38 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973); infra Part II.A. 
39 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; infra Part II.A. 
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But the Internet is different-there are no central controls over 
where online content is distributed in the United States. This lack of 
control has lead to fractured ambivalence among Supreme Court Jus-
tices over whether a national or local standard approach should be 
used when judging online content.40 
Enter "geotargeting," a new means by which online publishers 
can control where their content is accessible.41 This advance in tech-
nology heralds the resolution of the debate over whether local com-
munity standards should be applied to the Internet because publishers 
will be able to tailor their messages to the communities into which 
they wish to distribute their content, just as they have in all other me-
dia. The Court and many other courts have oft lamented that publish-
ers of online content had no control over where their material was 
downloaded. 42 Geotargeting promises to be the white knight that can 
rescue obscenity law from its current paralysis over what to do with 
the Internet. 
. This Note explains how the use of geotargeting resolves the ques-
tlo~ of whether local community standards should be used to judge 
onlme content. Part II of this Note provides a background of tradi-
tional obscenity law and the Supreme Court's indecision over whether 
local community standards should apply to obscenity on the Internet. 
Part III ~etails ho~ two United States Courts of Appeals have split 
ov~r onlme obscemty and discusses the rationales for applying the 
national and local obscenity standards to the Internet. Part IV analyzes 
how geotargeting technology makes applying local standards to the 
Internet more reasonable than applying national standards, and pro-
poses a modified local standard that can be applied to online obscen-
ity. Part V concludes with predictions on the use of geotargeting tech-
nology and how the Court can apply traditional obscenity law to the 
Internet. 
I. BACKGROUND: A PRIMER ON PRURIENCE 
[S]ex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is 
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to pruri-
ent interests. 43 
~ . . 
See infra Part II.B; see generally Ronald P. Reid, Case Note, Ashcroft v. 
America~ Civil Liberties Union, 7 JONES L. REv. 95, 103-11 (2003). 
See infra Part IV. 
:: See infra, notes 97 & 120 and accompanying text. 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957); cf WEBSTER'S 
DICTIONARY: supra no~e 22, at 1829 (defining "prurient" as "longings marked by 
restless cravmg ... havmg or easily susceptible to lascivious thoughts or desires."). 
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- Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 
Obscenity is not protected speech.44 Under the First Amendment 
to the Constitution, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech .... "45 The strong language used in the First 
Amendment seems to imply that freedom of speech covers every kind 
of speech or expression. However, "it is well understood that the right 
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circum-
stances."46 Certain kinds of speech may be classified as illegal, and a 
person may be punished for publishing such speech.47 Obscene "utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality."48 Obscenity law's foundations seem clear enough, but 
the application of legal standards to obscenity has a long and troubled 
history.49 After a number of iterations, the Court finally settled on a 
definition in the case of Miller v. California.50 
Part II.A discusses the Miller test for obscenity, how the Court 
decided to allow local communities to determine obscenity standards 
(rather than impose a national standard), and how the Court extended 
the local community standard for obscenity to nearly every form of 
communication. Part II.B then examines the Court's fragmented deci-
sion in Ashcroft v. ACLU and how the Internet's independence from 
real-world geography caused the Court to doubt whether local com-
munity standards should extend to online content. 
A. Miller and the Precedent for Local Community Standards: 
Why the Court Agrees it is All About Location, Location, 
Location 
44 Miller, 413 U.S. at 23. 
45 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
46 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
47 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."); 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1460-1470 (2006) (criminalizing the distribution of obscene material). 
48 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72). 
49 Miller, 413 U.S. at 20-23 (reviewing the highlights of "the somewhat 
tortured history of the Court's obscenity decisions"); see also Chris Hunt, Community 
Standards in Obscenity Adjudication, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1278-83 (1978) (de-
scribing in greater detail the history of obscenity law prior to Miller); GEORGE B. 
DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET§ 12.01, 12-4 to 12-8 (2010) 
(giving a very detailed history of obscenity law). 
50 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
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to the Constitution, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech .... "45 The strong language used in the First 
Amendment seems to imply that freedom of speech covers every kind 
of speech or expression. However, "it is well understood that the right 
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circum-
stances."46 Certain kinds of speech may be classified as illegal, and a 
person may be punished for publishing such speech.47 Obscene "utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality."48 Obscenity law's foundations seem clear enough, but 
the application of legal standards to obscenity has a long and troubled 
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46 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
47 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."); 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1460-1470 (2006) (criminalizing the distribution of obscene material). 
48 Roth, 354 U.S. at485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at571-72). 
49 Miller, 413 U.S. at 20-23 (reviewing the highlights of "the somewhat 
tortured history of the Court's obscenity decisions"); see also Chris Hunt, Community 
Standards in Obscenity Adjudication, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1278-83 (1978) (de-
scribing in greater detail the history of obscenity law prior to Miller); GEORGE B. 
DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET§ 12.01, 12-4 to 12-8 (2010) 
(giving a very detailed history of obscenity law). 
50 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
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In Miller, the Court specified three criteria to decide whether or 
not a publication is protected free speech or unprotected obscenity.51 
One of the criteria asks "whether the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards" would find that the alleged obscene 
material appeals to an unwholesome sexual interest.52 In Miller, the 
Court explained that the local community into which a work had been 
published gets to define the line between eroticism and obscenity us-
ing its local community standards. 53 Thus it is the recipient commu-
nity, represented by jurors in a trial, that judges whether speech is 
outside the protection of the First Amendment. 54 
The Court ultimately rejected a uniform national standard.55 In-
stead, the Court felt that community standards 
are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too 
big and diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such 
standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single for-
mulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. . .. 
[T]o structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a na-
tional "community standard" would be an exercise in futility. 56 
The Court determined a national community standard was "unrea-
sonable" because it "is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to 
read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or 
Mississippi accept the depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las 
Vegas, or New York City .... [D]iversity is not to be strangled by the 
absolutism of imposed uniformity."57 
Because the facts in Miller dealt with the mass mailing of alleg-
edly obscene printed material, the Court's holding meant that local 
community standards should be used when examining obscenity in 
print media.58 However, publishers challenged the application of 
51 Id. ("The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the 
work . . . appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in 
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct ... ; and (c) whether the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.") (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 30-34. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 30. 
57 Id. at 32-33. 
58 Id. at 16-18. 
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Miller to other media,59 relying on the Court's assertion that "differ-
ences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the 
. d d l" d h "60 Frrst Amendment stan ar s app 1e to t em. 
Twice, the Supreme Court firmly reiterated that for traditional 
media, the local community standard for obscenity the proper stan-
dard. 61 The Court has noted that even though a local standard ap-
proach might dissuade the publication of otherwise protected materi-
als (because the publisher "would be unwilling to risk criminal con-
viction by testing variations in standards from place to place"62), the 
Court concluded that the local standard best balanced the advantages 
and disadvantages associated with using either standard. By using 
local standards, publishers could tailor their messages by controlling 
the geographic locations where their messages would be published.63 
Thus, for communications by mail, telephone, radio, and television, 
obscenity is determined using a local standard that is tied to the geo-
graphic space where the work was distributed. 64 
59 E.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (obscen-
ity charges against a "dial-a-porn" operator). 
60 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). 
61 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 116 ("There is no constitutional barrier under Miller 
to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some communities under loc~l 
standards even though they are not obscene in others."); see also Hamling v. Umted 
States, 418 U.S. 87, 104, 106 (1974) ("A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowl-
edge of the views of the average person in the community or vicinag~ from which he 
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standards of obscenity."); see Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26 ("If Sable's audience is 
comprised of different communities with different local standards, Sable [the pub-
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messages."). 
64 While there is some nuance to the definition of the geographic contours of 
the local community, the Court has held that the community standards are informed 
by the geographic space where the obscene material was received. ~ee Jenkin~ v. ,, . 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (holding that "States have considerable latitude m 
framing the geographic contours of the community, ranging from leaving the bound-
ary undefined, or defining the local community using precise boundaries); see, e.g., 
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In Miller, the Court specified three criteria to decide whether or 
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temporary community standards" would find that the alleged obscene 
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outside the protection of the First Amendment. s4 
The Court ultimately rejected a uniform national standard.ss In-
stead, the Court felt that community standards 
are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too 
big and diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such 
standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single for-
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a patently offensive way, sexual conduct ... ; and (c) whether the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.") (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 30-34. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 30. 
57 Id. at 32-33. 
58 Id. at 16-18. 
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Miller to other media,s9 relying on the Court's assertion that "differ-
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. d d l" d h "60 First Amendment stan ar s app 1e to t em. 
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B. Ashcroft and the Web Gone Wild: How the Lack of Geo-
graphic Controls Made the Court Doubt the Applicability 
of Local Community Standards to the Internet 
Miller established "local community standards" as the appropriate 
gauge for determining obscenity in traditional media. But when the 
Internet emerged as a new medium divorced from real-world geogra-
phy, the extension of traditional obscenity law became problematic. 
Online content was available nationwide, and the Court became con-
cerned that using local community standards might chill too much free 
speech.65 
Ashcroft v. ACLU ("Ashcroft I") is the most recent decision in 
which the Supreme Court raises the question of whether local stan-
dards apply to online content.66 In 1998, Congress, alarmed by the rise 
in obscenity and indecency on the Internet, and fearing easy access by 
minors, passed the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA").67 COPA 
copied the Miller criteria nearly verbatim to define online material 
prohibited by the Act, including "applying contemporary community 
standards" to determine whether material appealed to the prurient 
interest. 68 
A number of Justices were concerned that applying local stan-
dards to a medium with inherently national content would chill too 
much speech.69 Thus, Ashcroft I fragmented into at least five distinct 
opinions, with no clear consensus on whether local, national, or some 
65 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-88 (1997) (expressing concern that 
using "community standards" when regulating online content could cause it to "be 
judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the mes-
sage"); 
66 Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
67 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2010) (criminalizing the distribution of obscene material 
to minors); see also 2 GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE 
INTERNET § 12.02, 12-32 to 12-66.1 (3d ed. 2010) (summarizing Congress' attempt to 
regulate the Internet through COP A). 
68 47 U.S.C. § 231(6) (2010). 
69 Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (using a local community standard "would potentially suppress 
an inordinate amount of expression"); id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (using a local community standard "would provide the 
most puritan of communities with a heckler's veto affecting the rest of the Nation"); 
id. at 594-96 (Kennedy, J., with whom Souter, J., & Ginsburg, J., join, concurring in 
the judgment) (using a local community standard could lead web publishers to avoid 
using the Internet because they cannot control who receives their content); id. at 612 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (using local community standards would remove all online 
speech that was intolerable to the least-tolerant community). 
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other community standard should be used for the new online medium 
in which geographic control was nonexistent.70 
The plurality opinion71 (fully endorsed by Justices Thomas, 
Scalia, and Rehnquist, and joined in part by Justices O'Connor and 
Breyer) noted that while there was no requirement that the community 
standards had to be tied to some precise geography, it was inevitable 
that jurors will draw upon their respective local communities to de-
termine if a work is obscene.72 The plurality further noted that the 
unique characteristics associated with the Internet did not justify 
adopting a different approach to obscenity, and posited that the con-
tinued application of a local standard to the Internet was tolerable.73 
Recognizing the need for some consensus, Justices Thomas, Scalia, 
and Rehnquist conceded their position and merely ended the plurality 
opinion by stating that, "[t]he scope of our decision today is quite 
limited. We hold only that COP A's reliance on community standards 
to identify [obscene material] does not by itself render the statute [un-
constitutional]."74 Thus, COPA was not struck down for its use of 
local standards, but instead was remanded to the lower court with in-
structions to determine if there were other reasons that made COP A 
unconstitutional. 75 
In a separate opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the 
judgment,76 Justice O'Connor felt compelled to "express [her] own 
views on the constitutionality and desirability of adopting a national 
70 See infra notes 71-96; see generally Reid, supra note 40. 
71 Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 566-86 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion). 
72 Id. at 576-77 ("[C]ommunity standards need not be defined by reference 
to precise geographic area .... Absent geographic specification, a juror applying 
community standards will inevitably draw upon personal knowledge of the commu-
nity or vicinage from which he comes.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
73 Id. at 583 ("While Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens question the appli-
cability of this Court's community standards jurisprudence to the Internet, we do not 
believe that the medium's 'unique characteristics' justify adopting a different ap-
proach than that set forth in Hamling and Sable [i.e. using local community stan-
dards]."). 
74 Id. at 585 (emphasis in the original). Eight Justices agreed with the deci-
sion to not overrule COP A on the use of local community standards, and the various 
opinions reiterated the narrowness of their agreement. See id. at 576 (Thomas, J., 
plurality opinion) ("[W]e do not think it prudent to engage in speculation [about 
community standards] and deciding this case does not require us to do so."); Id. at 
596 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In any event, we need not decide 
whether [COPA] invokes local or national community standards to conclude that 
vacatur and remand are in order."). 
75 Id. at 586. 
76 Id. at 586-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring injudg-
ment). 
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76 Id. at 586-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring injudg-
ment). 
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standard for obscenity regulation on the Internet."77 She explained 
using a local standard would chill too much speech, "effectively 
forc[ing] all speakers on the Web to abide by the most puritan com-
munity's standards." 78 Given Internet publishers' "inability to control 
the geographic location of their audience," requiring such publishers 
to control where their speech was received would be unduly burden-
some, and would "potentially suppress an inordinate amount of ex-
pression."79 Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, a national standard 
would be less chilling for Internet speech. However, Justice O'Connor 
concluded by noting that although she wished the Court would "ex-
plicitly adopt[] a national standard for defining obscenity on the Inter-
net,"80 she agreed with the plurality that under the circumstances of 
the case, local standards alone were not sufficient to invalidate 
COPA.81 
In a contrasting opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment, 82 Justice Breyer argued that Congress never intended for 
COP A to apply a local standard, but instead intended to apply a "na-
tionally uniform adult-based standard" to online content.83 He argued 
that although a juror might inevitably use his own local standards to 
judge obscenity, such variations would be minor and would not in-
validate a national standard.84 Notwithstanding his advocacy of a na-
tional standard, Justice Breyer conceded that the use of local standards 
was tolerable and, as such, did not invalidate COP A. 85 
In a fourth opinion, Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg ex-
pressed their own concerns about both the national and local stan-
dards. 86 They agreed with the plurality that local standards are some-
times appropriate;87 however, they were also concerned that the 
unique characteristics of the Internet may "justify differences in the 
First Amendment standards applied to [the Internet]."88 The three Jus-
tices noted that applying a local standard in other media was tolerable 
because publishers could easily target their audience geographically. 89 
77 Id. at 586. 
78 Id. at 577. 
79 Id. at 587. 
80 Id. at 589. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 589-91 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
83 Id. at 591. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 589. 
86 Id. at 591-602 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
87 Id. at 594. 
88 Id. at 595. 
89 Id. at 595-97. 
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In contrast, using a local standard to judge online content presented a 
"particular burden on Internet speech" due to inevitable variation 
among the nation's communities.90 Nevertheless, the three Justices 
could not decide which standard was appropriate in this case and 
merely concurred in the judgment.91 
In the fifth and final opinion, Justice Stevens provided the only 
dissent.92 Justice Stevens reasoned that because Internet publishers 
have no control over where their content is distributed, using the 
community standards set forth in Miller leads to overbreadth in any 
application to online content.93 Stevens principally disagreed with the 
plurality's acceptance of local standards for the Internet; but he also 
criticized Justice Kennedy's opinion.94 Although Justice Stevens con-
ceded that obscene "hard-core pornography ... does not belong on the 
Internet," he nevertheless felt that "applying community standards to 
the Internet will restrict a substantial amount of protected speech," 
because the "sorting mechanism [present in other geographically 
linked media] does not exist in cyberspace."95 Justice Stevens did not 
propose some other standard or criterion for obscenity on the Inter-
net-he merely disagreed with using community standards as detailed 
by the other Justices.96 
It is notable that each opinion (and thus every Justice of the 
Court) lamented the fact that online technology lacked the same geo-
graphic controls available in all other media.97 
Ashcroft I thus provides little guidance about how to determine 
obscenity online, instead leaving lower courts with the unenviable 
task of interpreting Ashcroft I to decide which community standard, if 
any, should apply to the Internet. Since eight Justices concurred in the 
judgment, the most that can be said is that using local standards does 
not automatically condemn Internet regulation as unconstitutional. 98 
90 Id. at 597. 
91 Id. at 591-602 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
92 Id. at 602-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 605-06. 
94 Id. at 605-06, 609-11. 
95 Id. at611-12. 
96 See id. at602-12. 
97 See id. at568,575,577,580-82,583,587,590,595-596,605-606. 
Ashcroft I wasn't the first time the Court wished the Internet had more geographic 
controls. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) ("[I]t is not currently possible 
to exclude persons from accessing certain messages on the basis of their identity."). 
98 See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656, 664 (2004) (stating the 
"holding [in Ashcroft I was] that the community-standards language did not, standing 
alone, make the statute unconstitutionally overbroad."). In Ashcroft II, the Court 
found that COPA was unconstitutional, but only on the grounds that the statute's 
language was overbroad, with little discussion of whether local community standards 
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But, knowing that the use of local standards to regulate the Internet 
might not be unconstitutional does not provide clear guidance about 
whether the Court should use local standards for Internet obscenity. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: SPLITTING THE CIRCUITS 
Obscenity is whatever happens to shock some elderly and igno-
rant magistrate.99 
- Bertrand Russell 
Because of the Supreme Court's vague, noncommittal, and frac-
tured holding in Ashcroft I, lower courts have to grapple with Internet 
obscenity cases without the clarion guidance of whether a local or 
national community standard applies. Two recent United States 
Courts of Appeals decisions stand on opposite sides of this issue, and 
highlight the main theories behind the arguments for applying one 
standard over the other to Internet obscenity cases. 100 
A. The Ninth Circuit: Kilbride and the National Community 
Standard 
In October 2009, the Ninth Circuit "squarely turned its back"101 
on the long-standing local community standard used by courts when 
analyzing all other forms of media. 102 In United States v. Kilbride the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that national community standards should be ap-
plied to the Internet because the Internet was so completely devoid of 
geographic controls. 103 
The defendants (Jeffrey Kilbride and James Schaffer) began ad-
vertising borderline-obscene porn via email in 2003.104 They earned a 
commission every time an email recipient used links in his or her 
tied to geography should or should not be used for Internet obscenity cases. See id. at 
664-70. 
99 What They Are Saying, LOOK MAGAZINE, Feb. 23 1954 at 26. 
100 ' ' See United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming 
the use of a local community standard); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that the jury should have applied a national community standard). 
101 Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? 
The Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's Groundbreaking Understanding of Commu-
nity Standards in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REv. 47, 53 (2010). 
102 Id. 
103 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1250--55. 
104 Id. at 1244-45 ("Defendants' convictions arose from ... their business of 
sending unsolicited bulk email ... advertising adult websites"). 
2011] 2 OBSCENITY STANDARDS, 1 NEAT SOLUTION 171 
email to access and pay for online content. 105 But the emails contained 
more than mere links-they also had graphic images of extreme sex 
acts, 106 which compelled over 662,000 people who received the mes-
sages to complain to the Federal Trade Commission.107 The two men 
were charged with distributing obscene material in violation of Fed-
eral obscenity law.108 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it 
could use the community standards of "society at large, or people in 
general," and that the community they "should consider ... is not de-
fined by a precise geographic area."109 The jury found the two men 
guilty of distributing obscenity, and they were sentenced to approxi-
1 f . f. ·1 . 110 mate y 1ve years o Jal -time. 
The defendants appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were 
prejudicial and plainly erroneous. They reasoned that because they 
had no control over where their email spam would be downloaded, a 
fully national standard should apply. 111 Thus, the defendants argued 
the jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they 
failed to adequately inform the jury that when using community stan-
dards to judge obscenity, the jury should consider nothing less than 
the nation-wide community. 112 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the de-
fendants that a national standard should apply to Internet obscenity 
cases, but at the same time, held that the jury instructions were not 
plainly erroneous under a national community standard.113 
The Ninth Circuit arrived at this decision by first interpreting 
what it considered to be the holding of Ashcroft /. 114 The court em-
105 Id. ("If a recipient of the Defendants' emails signed onto the advertised 
website and paid a fee, Defendants earned a commission from the entity promoted,"). 
106 See Indictment at 14-15, United States v. Kilbride, No. 2:05-cr-00870-
DGC (D. Ariz. Aug. 25, 2005), ECF No. 1. 
107 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1245 ("The Government also presented evidence of 
over 662,000 complaints received by the FTC from around the country concerning 
Defendants' emails."). 
108 Id. (The charges included violations of 18 U.S.C. §1037(a)(3), 18 U.S.C. § 
1037(a)(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1462, 18 U.S.C. § 1465, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18 U.S.C. § 
2257). 
109 Id. at 1248. 
110 See id. at 1245. 
111 Id. at 1247. 
112 See Appellants' Joint Opening Brief at 33-40, United States v. Kilbride, 
584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-10528), 2008 WL 4127267 at *33-40. 
113 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254-55 ("A national community standard must be 
applied in regulation obscene speech on the internet ... [but] the court has never held 
that a jury may in no case be instructed to apply a national community standard in 
finding obscenity."). 
114 Id. at 1252-55 ("COPA's reliance on community standards does not by 
itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amend-
ment"). 
170 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY, & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:1 
But, knowing that the use of local standards to regulate the Internet 
might not be unconstitutional does not provide clear guidance about 
whether the Court should use local standards for Internet obscenity. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: SPLITTING THE CIRCUITS 
Obscenity is whatever happens to shock some elderly and igno-
rant magistrate. 99 
- Bertrand Russell 
Because of the Supreme Court's vague, noncommittal, and frac-
tured holding in Ashcroft I, lower courts have to grapple with Internet 
obscenity cases without the clarion guidance of whether a local or 
national community standard applies. Two recent United States 
Courts of Appeals decisions stand on opposite sides of this issue, and 
highlight the main theories behind the arguments for applying one 
standard over the other to Internet obscenity cases. 100 
A. The Ninth Circuit: Kilbride and the National Community 
Standard 
In October 2009, the Ninth Circuit "squarely turned its back"101 
on the long-standing local community standard used by courts when 
analyzing all other forms of media.102 In United States v. Kilbride the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that national community standards should be ap-
plied to the Internet because the Internet was so completely devoid of 
geographic controls.103 
The defendants (Jeffrey Kilbride and James Schaffer) began ad-
vertising borderline-obscene porn via email in 2003. 104 They earned a 
commission every time an email recipient used links in his or her 
tied to geography should or should not be used for Internet obscenity cases. See id. at 
664-70. 
99 What They Are Saying, LOOK MAGAZINE, Feb. 23 1954 at 26. 
100 ' ' See United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159 (I Ith Cir. 2010) (affirming 
the use of a local community standard); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that the jury should have applied a national community standard). 
101 Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? 
The Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's Groundbreaking Understanding of Commu-
nity Standards in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REv. 47, 53 (2010). 
102 Id. 
103 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1250-55. 
104 Id. at 1244-45 ("Defendants' convictions arose from ... their business of 
sending unsolicited bulk email ... advertising adult websites"). 
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email to access and pay for online content.105 But the emails contained 
more than mere links-they also had graphic images of extreme sex 
acts, 106 which compelled over 662,000 people who received the mes-
sages to complain to the Federal Trade Commission.107 The two men 
were charged with distributing obscene material in violation of Fed-
eral obscenity law.108 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it 
could use the community standards of "society at large, or people in 
general," and that the community they "should consider ... is not de-
fined by a precise geographic area."109 The jury found the two men 
guilty of distributing obscenity, and they were sentenced to approxi-
mately five years of jail-time.110 
The defendants appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were 
prejudicial and plainly erroneous. They reasoned that because they 
had no control over where their email spam would be downloaded, a 
fully national standard should apply. 111 Thus, the defendants argued 
the jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they 
failed to adequately inform the jury that when using community stan-
dards to judge obscenity, the jury should consider nothing less than 
the nation-wide community .112 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the de-
fendants that a national standard should apply to Internet obscenity 
cases, but at the same time, held that the jury instructions were not 
plainly erroneous under a national community standard. 113 
The Ninth Circuit arrived at this decision by first interpreting 
what it considered to be the holding of Ashcroft /. 114 The court em-
105 Id. ("If a recipient of the Defendants' emails signed onto the advertised 
website and paid a fee, Defendants earned a commission from the entity promoted,"). 
106 See Indictment at 14-15, United States v. Kilbride, No. 2:05-cr-00870-
DGC (D. Ariz. Aug. 25, 2005), ECF No. 1. 
107 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1245 ("The Government also presented evidence of 
over 662,000 complaints received by the FTC from around the country concerning 
Defendants' emails."). 
108 Id. (The charges included violations of 18 U.S.C. §1037(a)(3), 18 U.S.C. § 
1037(a)(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1462, 18 U.S.C. § 1465, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18 U.S.C. § 
2257). 
109 Id. at 1248. 
110 See id. at 1245. 
111 Id. at 1247. 
112 See Appellants' Joint Opening Brief at 33-40, United States v. Kilbride, 
584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-10528), 2008 WL 4127267 at *33-40. 
113 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254-55 ("A national community standard must be 
applied in regulation obscene speech on the internet ... [but] the court has never held 
that a jury may in no case be instructed to apply a national community standard in 
finding obscenity."). 
114 Id. at 1252-55 ("COPA's reliance on community standards does not by 
itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amend-
ment"). 
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ployed the Marks Rule, which requires that "[ w ]hen a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result en-
joys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds."115 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined the five fragmented opinions of Ashcroft/, and by overlapping 
the various concurrences, concluded that the narrowest grounds upon 
which a holding could be based was that "while application of a na-
tional community standard would not or may not create constitutional 
concern, application of local community standards likely would."116 
Notwithstanding its conclusion that national standards should be 
applied to Internet obscenity cases, the court upheld the defendants' 
convictions because the jury instructions had been adequate. 117 The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that plain error is found only when the case 
law is "clear and obvious," and the district court fails to follow that 
clear and obvious precedent. 118 But, because the case law was not 
clear and had required the Ninth Circuit to divine a holding from 
Ashcroft I, the district court had not committed clear and obvious error 
by giving jury instructions requiring less than a fully national standard 
for judging online obscenity. 119 
It is noteworthy that the Kilbride court lamented that online pub-
lishers are not able to tailor their message for specific geographic ar-
eas like they can in traditional media.120 
B. The Eleventh Circuit: Little and the Local Community 
Standard 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in United 
States v. Little concluded the opposite of Kilbride: local standards 
should apply to Internet obscenity cases. 121 Interestingly, the Eleventh 
Circuit marked this circuit-splitting opinion to remain unpublished. 122 
115 Id. at 1253-54 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
116 Id. at 1254. 
117 Id. at 1255 ("In light ofour holding, the district court's jury instructions 
defining obscenity pursuant to Hamling was error. However, this error does not re-
quire reversal because the district court's error was far from plain"). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1255 ("[O]ur conclusion was far from clear and obvious to the dis-
trict court. Hence, we conclude that the district court committed no reversible error in 
its §§ 1462 and 1465 jury instructions"). 
120 Id. at 1250-51. 
121 United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 166 (11th Cir. 2010). 
122 See generally id. 
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Defendant Paul Little, a.k.a. Max Hardcore, moved to California 
and began producing pornographic films in the early 1990s.123 Mr. 
Little's pornography pushed the boundaries of decency, and his self-
described "vile and crazy"124 videos garnered negative attention both 
inside and outside the porn industry, 125 including the attention of the 
Federal government. 
In 2007, the Department of Justice conducted an investigation into 
the content on Mr. Little's website,126 after which it indicted Mr. Little 
for distributing obscenity .127 One mild description of the videos stated 
that they portrayed "abusive sexual acts between adult males and fe-
males dressed to look and act like minor children," including, "simu-
128 Af . d. Mr L. 1 lated rape" and other extreme sex acts. ter m 1ctment, . 1tt e 
moved to dismiss the case because it had relied on a local community 
standard, arguing that after Ashcroft/, local standards could not con-
stitutionally apply to Internet obscenity.129 The trial court dismissed 
the motion to dismiss, holding that local standards still applied to the 
Internet.130 At trial the district judge noted "it would be very difficult 
for the jury to sit through five of these [videos]," and after viewing 
some of the videos the jury passed a note to the judge begging that 
123 See THE INTERNET Movrn DATABASE, 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0362065/bio (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); EXCALIBUR 
FILMS, http://www.excaliburfilms.com/pornlist/starpgs/Max_Hardcore.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2011). 
124 Steve C., Interview with Legendary Adult Director Max Hardcore, 
FOUNDRYMUSIC.COM (July 20, 2005), 
http://www.foundrymusic.com/bands/ displayinterview .cfm ?id= 130. 
125 Peter S. Scholtes, Devil in the Flesh, CITYPAGES.COM (Jan 14, 1998), 
http://www.citypages.com/1998-01-14/arts/devil-in-the-flesh/1 ("Hardcore is among 
the most hated men in the [porn] industry. He's rumored to have put several actresses 
in the hospital, and most starlets refuse to work with him."). 
126 Order at 1, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. 
Fla. Jan 16, 2008), ECF No. 64, 2008 WL 151875 at *1. 
127 Indictment, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. 
Fla. May 17, 2007), ECF No. 1, 2007 WL 4401063. 
128 Government's Response and Memorandum to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss at 2, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 
2008), ECF No. 63, 2007 WL 2809549 at *2 (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Susannah Breslin, To the Max, THE REVERSE COWGIRL (Oct. 6, 2008, 8:53 PM), 
http://reversecowgirlblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/to-max.html (describing Hardcore's 
videos in which "women are verbally and physically degraded in an unprecedented 
myriad of ways," which "[e]ven for the most jaded porn watcher, Little's oeuvre is 
over the top. Watching Little's work is less like watching a porn movie than it is akin 
to witnessing a vivisection."). 
129 Defendants Max World Entm't. Inc. and Paul Little's Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment at 19-21 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2007), ECF No. 
56, 2007 WL 4401064 at *19-21; see also Order supra note 126, at 2. 
130 Order, supra note 126, at 2. 
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ployed the Marks Rule, which requires that "[ w ]hen a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result en-
joys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds."115 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined the five fragmented opinions of Ashcroft/, and by overlapping 
the various concurrences, concluded that the narrowest grounds upon 
which a holding could be based was that "while application of a na-
tional community standard would not or may not create constitutional 
concern, application of local community standards likely would."116 
Notwithstanding its conclusion that national standards should be 
applied to Internet obscenity cases, the court upheld the defendants' 
convictions because the jury instructions had been adequate. 117 The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that plain error is found only when the case 
law is "clear and obvious," and the district court fails to follow that 
clear and obvious precedent. 118 But, because the case law was not 
clear and had required the Ninth Circuit to divine a holding from 
Ashcroft/, the district court had not committed clear and obvious error 
by giving jury instructions requiring less than a fully national standard 
for judging online obscenity. 119 
It is noteworthy that the Kilbride court lamented that online pub-
lishers are not able to tailor their message for specific geographic ar-
eas like they can in traditional media.120 
B. The Eleventh Circuit: Little and the Local Community 
Standard 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in United 
States v. Little concluded the opposite of Kilbride: local standards 
should apply to Internet obscenity cases. 121 Interesting! y, the Eleventh 
Circuit marked this circuit-splitting opinion to remain unpublished. 122 
115 Id. at 1253-54 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
116 Id. at 1254. 
117 Id. at 1255 ("In light ofour holding, the district court's jury instructions 
defining obscenity pursuant to Hamling was error. However, this error does not re-
quire reversal because the district court's error was far from plain"). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1255 ("[O]ur conclusion was far from clear and obvious to the dis-
trict court. Hence, we conclude that the district court committed no reversible error in 
its§§ 1462 and 1465 jury instructions"). 
120 Id. at 1250-51. 
121 United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 166 (11th Cir. 2010). 
122 See generally id. 
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Defendant Paul Little, a.k.a. Max Hardcore, moved to California 
and began producing pornographic films in the early 1990s.123 Mr. 
Little's pornography pushed the boundaries of decency, and his self-
described "vile and crazy"124 videos garnered negative attention both 
inside and outside the porn industry, 125 including the attention of the 
Federal government. 
In 2007, the Department of Justice conducted an investigation into 
the content on Mr. Little's website,126 after which it indicted Mr. Little 
for distributing obscenity .127 One mild description of the videos stated 
that they portrayed "abusive sexual acts between adult males and fe-
males dressed to look and act like minor children," including, "simu-
128 Af . d. Mr L. I lated rape" and other extreme sex acts. term 1ctment, . 1tt e 
moved to dismiss the case because it had relied on a local community 
standard, arguing that after Ashcroft /, local standards could not con-
stitutionally apply to Internet obscenity .129 The trial court dismissed 
the motion to dismiss, holding that local standards still applied to the 
Internet.130 At trial the district judge noted "it would be very difficult 
for the jury to sit through five of these [videos]," and after viewing 
some of the videos the jury passed a note to the judge begging that 
123 See THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0362065/bio (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); EXCALIBUR 
FILMS, http://www.excaliburfilms.com/pornlist/starpgs/Max_Hardcore.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2011). 
124 Steve C., Interview with Legendary Adult Director Max Hardcore, 
FOUNDRYMUSIC.COM (July 20, 2005), 
http://www.foundrymusic.com/bands/ displayinterview .cfm ?id= 130. 
125 Peter S. Scholtes, Devil in the Flesh, CITYPAGES.COM (Jan 14, 1998), 
http://www.citypages.com/1998-01-14/arts/devil-in-the-flesh/1 ("Hardcore is among 
the most hated men in the [porn] industry. He's rumored to have put several actresses 
in the hospital, and most starlets refuse to work with him."). 
126 Order at 1, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. 
Fla. Jan 16, 2008), ECF No. 64, 2008 WL 151875 at *1. 
127 Indictment, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. 
Fla. May 17, 2007), ECF No. 1, 2007 WL 4401063. 
128 Government's Response and Memorandum to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss at 2, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 
2008), ECF No. 63, 2007 WL 2809549 at *2 (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Susannah Breslin, To the Max, THE REVERSE COWGIRL (Oct. 6, 2008, 8:53 PM), 
http://reversecowgirlblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/to-max.html (describing Hardcore's 
videos in which "women are verbally and physically degraded in an unprecedented 
myriad of ways," which "[e]ven for the most jaded porn watcher, Little's oeuvre is 
over the top. Watching Little's work is less like watching a porn movie than it is akin 
to witnessing a vivisection."). 
129 Defendants Max World Entm't. Inc. and Paul Little's Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment at 19-21 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2007), ECF No. 
56, 2007 WL 4401064 at *19-21; see also Order supra note 126, at 2. 
130 Order, supra note 126, at 2. 
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they only be required to view a few clips. 131 Mr. Little was convicted 
of all ten counts of violating federal obscenity law, was sentenced to 
almost four years in prison, three years of probation, and was fined 
over $80,000.132 
On appeal Mr. Little argued that it was error to deny his motion to 
dismiss the indictment. Mr. Little asserted that local community stan-
dards should not apply to the Internet because he had no power to 
control the geographical areas into which his videos were pub-
lished.133 The Eleventh Circuit summarily rejected this argument in 
four short sentences. The court noted that three months earlier the 
Ninth Circuit in Kilbride had interpreted the holding in Ashcroft I "in 
such a way as to mandate a national community standard for Internet-
based material."134 However, the Eleventh Circuit "decline[d] to fol-
low the reasoning of Kilbride," stating that the portions of Ashcroft I 
"that advocated a national community standard were dicta, not the 
ruling of the court."135 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that using 
local community standards under Miller "remains the standard by 
which the Supreme Court has directed us to judge obscenity, on the 
Internet and elsewhere."136 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Mr. 
Little's conviction. However, due to a sentencing enhancement error, 
the case was remanded to the district court for re-sentencing. 137 
The Kilbride and Little decisions illustrate how reasonable people 
can interpret the Ashcroft I decision and arrive at contrasting conclu-
sions. They also illustrate how the lack of Supreme Court direction 
over which standard should be used for online obscenity cases could 
lead to even more splits among the circuits. It is noteworthy that the 
Little court-like the Kilbride court and the U.S. Supreme Court-
lamented that online publishers have no means to tailor their message 
like they can in traditional media. 138 
131 Clay Calvert, Judicial Erosion of Protection for Defendants in Obscenity 
Prosecutions?: When Courts Say, Literally, Enough is Enough and When Internet 
Availability Does Not Mean Acceptance, 1 HARV. J. OF SPORTS & ENT. L. 7, 22 
(2010); see Clerk's Minutes-General at 1, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-
00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2008), ECF No. 127 ("Playing of the dvds 
continued in open court. ... A note is sent to the Judge by one of the jurors .... View-
ing of the dvds continues.") 
132 United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 161 (11th Cir. 2010). 
133 Brief Of Defendants-Appellants Paul F. Little and Max World Ent., Inc. at 
13-17, United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159 (11th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15964), 
2009 WL 506653 at *13-17. 
134 Little, 365 F. App'x at 164. 
135 Id. at 164 & n.10. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 169. 
138 Id. at 163. 
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III. AVAILABLE AT AN INTERNET NEAR YOU: 
GEOTARGETING 
Reasonable people may debate about whether a local or national 
standard should apply to the Internet. But, a recent technological de-
velopment will end the debate and provide the Court with a good rea-
son to apply local community standards for online content just as it 
has done for all other media. This development, geotargeting, allows 
online publishers to control where their content is accessible. 
While there are already a number of reasons why the Court should 
apply local community standards to the Internet (such as incorrect 
attempts to interpret Ashcroft I as advocating national standards, 139 the 
impossibility of administering a national standard, 140 and the greater 
139 The Court explicitly stated that no other holding should be extrapolated 
from the Ashcroft I decision. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 
Ninth Circuit court erroneously applied the Marks Rule. Compare supra note 103 
(explaining how Kilbride's use of the Marks Rule on the Ashcroft I opinion was in-
correct because it disregarded prior Supreme Court precedent and failed to apply 
correct interpretive principles), with Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 
(1994) (signaling that the Marks inquiry should not be pursued to the "utmost logical 
possibility .... "), and Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court 
Plurality Decisions, 80 COL. L. REV. 756, 763 (1980) (explaining that although the 
Marks Rule can be used in some cases, "[m]ore often, however, there is no clear and 
explicit agreement on the reasoning supporting the result; instead, two essentially 
distinct rationales are proposed, and the overlap, if any, is merely implicit."), and 
Evan H. Carminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tux. L. REv. 1, 15 (1994) ("[T]here may not be a 
single dispositional rule endorsed by a majority of the judges. Instead, the disposition 
may be supported only by an individual or plurality opinion combined with one or 
more opinions concurring in the judgment. In such event, according to the conven-
tional model, the case establishes no precedential rule. Rather, a decision establishes a 
legal rule with precedential status only if a majority of judges invoke the same dispo-
sitional rule to justify the same disposition, typically embodied within an 'opinion of 
the court."'). 
140 Another reason is that using a national standard would prove impossible to 
administer in court proceedings. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 
(1973) (stating that in order to create a record of what the national standard is, which 
is "essentially a question[] of fact," it would necessitate asking a trier-of-fact to plumb 
the depths of the nation's opinion which would amount to "an exercise in futility"), 
with Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-05 (1974) (analyzing the "difficulty 
of formulating uniform national standards" and concluding "[n]othing in the First 
Amendment requires that a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable 'na-
tional standards' when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene 
as a matter of fact.") (internal quotations omitted), and Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964) (Warren, Chief J., dissenting) ("I believe that there is no 
provable 'national standard' and perhaps there should be none. At all events, this 
Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local 
courts to divine one."). 
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they only be required to view a few clips. 131 Mr. Little was convicted 
of all ten counts of violating federal obscenity law, was sentenced to 
almost four years in prison, three years of probation, and was fined 
over $80,000.132 
On appeal Mr. Little argued that it was error to deny his motion to 
dismiss the indictment. Mr. Little asserted that local community stan-
dards should not apply to the Internet because he had no power to 
control the geographical areas into which his videos were pub-
lished.133 The Eleventh Circuit summarily rejected this argument in 
four short sentences. The court noted that three months earlier the 
Ninth Circuit in Kilbride had interpreted the holding in Ashcroft I "in 
such a way as to mandate a national community standard for Internet-
based material."134 However, the Eleventh Circuit "decline[d] to fol-
low the reasoning of Kilbride," stating that the portions of Ashcroft I 
"that advocated a national community standard were dicta, not the 
ruling of the court."135 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that using 
local community standards under Miller "remains the standard by 
which the Supreme Court has directed us to judge obscenity, on the 
Internet and elsewhere."136 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Mr. 
Little's conviction. However, due to a sentencing enhancement error, 
the case was remanded to the district court for re-sentencing. 137 
The Kilbride and Little decisions illustrate how reasonable people 
can interpret the Ashcroft I decision and arrive at contrasting conclu-
sions. They also illustrate how the lack of Supreme Court direction 
over which standard should be used for online obscenity cases could 
lead to even more splits among the circuits. It is noteworthy that the 
Little court-like the Kilbride court and the U.S. Supreme Court-
lamented that online publishers have no means to tailor their message 
like they can in traditional media. 138 
131 Clay Calvert, Judicial Erosion of Protection for Defendants in Obscenity 
Prosecutions?: When Courts Say, Literally, Enough is Enough and When Internet 
Availability Does Not Mean Acceptance, 1 HARV. J. OF SPORTS & ENT. L. 7, 22 
(2010); see Clerk's Minutes-General at 1, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-
00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2008), ECF No. 127 ("Playing of the dvds 
continued in open court. ... A note is sent to the Judge by one of the jurors .... View-
ing of the dvds continues.") 
132 United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 161 (11th Cir. 2010). 
133 Brief Of Defendants-Appellants Paul F. Little and Max World Ent., Inc. at 
13-17, United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159 (11th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15964), 
2009 WL 506653 at *13-17. 
134 Little, 365 F. App'x at 164. 
135 Id. at 164 & n.10. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 169. 
138 Id. at 163. 
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ill. AVAILABLE AT AN INTERNET NEAR YOU: 
GEOTARGETING 
Reasonable people may debate about whether a local or national 
standard should apply to the Internet. But, a recent technological de-
velopment will end the debate and provide the Court with a good rea-
son to apply local community standards for online content just as it 
has done for all other media. This development, geotargeting, allows 
online publishers to control where their content is accessible. 
While there are already a number of reasons why the Court should 
apply local community standards to the Internet (such as incorrect 
attempts to interpret Ashcroft I as advocating national standards, 139 the 
impossibility of administering a national standard, 140 and the greater 
139 The Court explicitly stated that no other holding should be extrapolated 
from the Ashcroft I decision. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 
Ninth Circuit court erroneously applied the Marks Rule. Compare supra note 103 
(explaining how Kilbride's use of the Marks Rule on the Ashcroft I opinion was in-
correct because it disregarded prior Supreme Court precedent and failed to apply 
correct interpretive principles), with Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 
(1994) (signaling that the Marks inquiry should not be pursued to the "utmost logical 
possibility .... "), and Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court 
Plurality Decisions, 80 COL. L. REV. 756, 763 (1980) (explaining that although the 
Marks Rule can be used in some cases, "[m]ore often, however, there is no clear and 
explicit agreement on the reasoning supporting the result; instead, two essentially 
distinct rationales are proposed, and the overlap, if any, is merely implicit."), and 
Evan H. Carminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tux. L. REv. 1, 15 (1994) ("[T]here may not be a 
single dispositional rule endorsed by a majority of the judges. Instead, the disposition 
may be supported only by an individual or plurality opinion combined with one or 
more opinions concurring in the judgment. In such event, according to the conven-
tional model, the case establishes no precedential rule. Rather, a decision establishes a 
legal rule with precedential status only if a majority of judges invoke the same dispo-
sitional rule to justify the same disposition, typically embodied within an 'opinion of 
the court."'). 
140 Another reason is that using a national standard would prove impossible to 
administer in court proceedings. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 
(1973) (stating that in order to create a record of what the national standard is, which 
is "essentially a question[] of fact," it would necessitate asking a trier-of-fact to plumb 
the depths of the nation's opinion which would amount to "an exercise in futility"), 
with Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-05 (1974) (analyzing the "difficulty 
of formulating uniform national standards" and concluding "[n]othing in the First 
Amendment requires that a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable 'na-
tional standards' when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene 
as a matter of fact.") (internal quotations omitted), and Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964) (Warren, Chief J., dissenting) ("I believe that there is no 
provable 'national standard' and perhaps there should be none. At all events, this 
Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local 
courts to divine one."). 
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h·11· f:C . 141 c 1 mg e iects of a nat10nal standard ), the most important reason is 
that Internet users have developed and deployed a technology-
geotargeting-that allows online publishers to control where their 
content is received. The conflict between local and national standards 
for online obscenity springs from the idea that there were no intrinsic 
geographic controls similar to those in other traditional media-
geotargeting resolves the issue by giving online publishers the same 
power they have in all other media to target their audience. 
This section will give a short history of geotargeting, will explain 
how online geotargeting provides publishers of prurience the power to 
target particular geographic areas, and will conclude with a proposal 
for a modified local standard that can be used for online obscenity. 
A. The History and Ever Expanding Use of Geotargeting On 
the Internet 
Many assume that it is impossible to link active users of the Inter-
net to a geographical location. 142 However, this was not the case when 
the Internet was first created, and is not the case now. 
Throughout the first stages of the Internet's existence, users were 
requested to register with a central database, linking each user to a 
real-world name, physical mailing address, telephone number and ~ ' 
network mailbox. The central database tracked the real-world loca-
tions of users until the 1990s, when, in the interest of creating com-
petitive balance, registration with the database was deregulated and 
additional registrars were permitted to assign Internet domain 
141 Using a local standard provides the least-tolerant community with veto 
power on a nation-wide medium, thereby chilling the speech of the most tolerant of 
speakers; in contrast, a national standard forces obscene content on unwilling com-
n;iunities while it prevents ultra-tolerant communities from being able to publish pru-
nent content they could otherwise publish under the local standard. See supra notes 
56-57 and accompanying text; compare Matthew Towns, Note, The Community 
Standards of Utah and the Amish Country Rule the World Wide Web, 68 Mo. L. REV. 
735, 740-43 (2003) (explaining how under a local standard online speech would be 
chilled by giving the least-tolerant community a heckler's veto), with John V. Ed-
wards, Note, Obscenity in the Age Of Direct Broadcast Satellite: A Final Burial for 
Stanley v. Georgia(?), A National Obscenity Standard, and Other Miscellany, 33 WM. 
& ~ARY L. REv. 949, 992 (1992) (explaining that a national standard "compromis[es] 
the mterests of both the least tolerant and the most tolerant communities") 
142 . 
See Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other 
Means of Placing Borders on the 'Borderless' Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL}. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 101, 101 (2004). 
143 Network Working Group, NICNAMEIWHOIS, INTERNET ENGINEERING 
TASK FORCE 1 (Oct. 1985), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc954 (requesting early Internet 
users to be linked to real-world locations through registry with the WHOIS database). 
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names. 144 As more registrars were allowed, the database grew more 
complex and less transparent, 145 leading many to believe that the 
Internet's decentralized design and global reach made it technologi-
cally impossible to connect to real-world geography. 146 
Recent technological advances are recreating real-world borders 
on the previously borderless Internet making it much easier to connect 
each Internet user to a real-world location. 147 One sophisticated 
method uses Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with each 
domain registry to track the location of users.148 Typically a geo-
location company "maps" all the domains and their associated IP ad-
dresses to their real-world locations and stores that large amount of 
information into a private database.149 When a user seeks to access a 
certain website, his or her originating IP address can be compared to 
the records in the database, giving an educated guess about the access-
seeker' s location.150 Online advertisers and publishers of all types 
currently use geotargeting because it gives them the power to show 
customized messages to geographically defined audiences, which 
144 Management oflnternet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 
31,741-42, 31,749 (June 10, 1998); see also Memorandum of Understanding Between 
the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers, ICANN.ORG (Nov. 25, 1998), http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-
25nov98.htm; Brent A. Little & Cheryl B. Preston, /CANN Can: Contracts and Porn 
Sites-Choosing "To Play Internet Ball in American Cyberspace," 21 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 79, 82-85 (2008). 
145 See Accuracy and Integrity of the WHO IS Database: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 13-88 (2002), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/79752.pdf (summarizing the lack of accuracy in the 
WHOIS database and submitting four prepared statements from the FTC and other 
experts who blamed the inaccuracies in the WHOIS database on fraud, complexity, 
and lack of centralized oversight from ICANN). 
146 See Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting 
the Internet Gambling's Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 41, 41, 44, 
59-60 (2010); see also Svantesson, supra note 142. 
147 See Alex Blyth, IP Targeting: Hit or Miss?, REVOLUTION, Feb. 1, 2008, at 
42, available at 2008 WLNR 4114288; Andy Ellenthal, Local Target Practice, 
ADWEEK, Sept. 28, 2009, at 19, available at 2009 WLNR 19658449; Maria L. Mon-
tagnani, A New Inteiface Between Copyright Law and Technology, 26 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 719, 762-63 (2009) (describing how the BBC's website prevents non-
U.K. users from accessing some of its online content using geotargeting); Svantesson, 
supra note 142. 
148 Svantesson, supra note 142 at 109-10. There are also less sophisticated 
(but arguably equally valuable) geolocation methods. Id. at 120-22; see also Matthew 
Nelson, Utah's Trademark Protection Act: Over-Reaching Unconstitutional Protec-
tionism or Decisive Clarifying Legislation?, 2007 UTAHL. REV. 1199, 1214. 
149 Svantesson, supra note 142, at 110. 
150 Id. 
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tions of users until the 1990s, when, in the interest of creating com-
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names. 144 As more registrars were allowed, the database grew more 
complex and less transparent, 145 leading many to believe that the 
Internet's decentralized design and global reach made it technologi-
cally impossible to connect to real-world geography. 146 
Recent technological advances are recreating real-world borders 
on the previously borderless Internet making it much easier to connect 
each Internet user to a real-world location.147 One sophisticated 
method uses Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with each 
domain registry to track the location of users. 148 Typically a geo-
location company "maps" all the domains and their associated IP ad-
dresses to their real-world locations and stores that large amount of 
information into a private database.149 When a user seeks to access a 
certain website, his or her originating IP address can be compared to 
the records in the database, giving an educated guess about the access-
seeker' s location.150 Online advertisers and publishers of all types 
currently use geotargeting because it gives them the power to show 
customized messages to geographically defined audiences, which 
144 Management oflntemet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 
31,741-42, 31,749 (June 10, 1998); see also Memorandum of Understanding Between 
the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers, ICANN.ORG (Nov. 25, 1998), http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-
25nov98.htm; Brent A. Little & Cheryl B. Preston, !CANN Can: Contracts and Porn 
Sites-Choosing "To Play Internet Ball in American Cyberspace," 21 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 79' 82-85 (2008). 
145 See Accuracy and Integrity of the WHOIS Database: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 13-88 (2002), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/79752.pdf (summarizing the lack of accuracy in the 
WHO IS database and submitting four prepared statements from the FTC and other 
experts who blamed the inaccuracies in the WHOIS database on fraud, complexity, 
and lack of centralized oversight from ICANN). 
146 See Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting 
the Internet Gambling's Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 41, 44, 
59-60 (2010); see also Svantesson, supra note 142. 
147 See Alex Blyth, IP Targeting: Hit or Miss?, REVOLUTION, Feb. 1, 2008, at 
42, available at 2008 WLNR 4114288; Andy Ellenthal, Local Target Practice, 
ADWEEK, Sept. 28, 2009, at 19, available at 2009 WLNR 19658449; Maria L. Mon-
tagnani, A New lnteiface Between Copyright Law and Technology, 26 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 719, 762-63 (2009) (describing how the BBC's website prevents non-
U.K. users from accessing some of its online content using geotargeting); Svantesson, 
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148 Svantesson, supra note 142 at 109-10. There are also less sophisticated 
(but arguably equally valuable) geolocation methods. Id. at 120-22; see also Matthew 
Nelson, Utah's Trademark Protection Act: Over-Reaching Unconstitutional Protec-
tionism or Decisive Clarifying Legislation?, 2007 UTAHL. REV. 1199, 1214. 
149 Svantesson, supra note 142, at 110. 
150 Id. 
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maximizes advertising dollars and provides hyper-local responses to 
online queries. 151 
Thus, geo-location companies help advertisers or other Internet 
~ublishe:s quickly. ~nd efficiently locate their audience through such 
mform~t10n as a vlSltor's country, region, city, latitude, longitude, zip 
code, time zone, area code, local weather, and more. 152 There are 
websites that provide free, easy-to-use geolocation software that is 
99.5% accurate on a country level, and 60% accurate at the city 
level, 153 allowing· website designers to create customized lists that 
block as many (or as few) countries or cities as they wish from access-
ing a website's online content. 154 
B. How Geotargeting Gives Online Publishers the Power to 
Target Their Audience by Geography, Just as in Other 
Media 
As noted in Ashcroft I, Little, and Kilbride, courts have often la-
mented the fact that web publishers do not have the ability to control 
the geographic scope of the recipients of their communications, im-
ply~ng th~t if online publishers could control the geographic scope of 
their postmgs, the Court would be more willing to impose local com-
munity standards on the Internet, just as it has imposed local standards 
151 ~ee B.ob T~deschi, Borderless is Out; Advertisers Now Want to Know if a 
Customer Lzves zn Cazro, Egypt, or Cairo, Ill., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at C.10; see 
e.g., Geotargeting, GOOGLE.COM, 
http://:':'w.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=62399 
~last v1s1ted .Nov. 13, 20_11) (describing how webmasters can use Google's geotarget-
mg tool1~Jo mcrease therr exposure to users in a specific geographic area). Svantesson, supra note 142, at 110. See id. at 111 n.40 (listing eight popu-
lar geolocation companies); Demo, GEOBYTES.COM, 
http://www.geobytes.com/demo.htm (last modified Aug. 29, 2006) (providing a less-
than-cla~sy, but very informative, demonstration of the information available using 
geolocatton software, as well as how easy it is to use geolocation software). Since Mr. 
Svantesson's article, additional companies have entered and dominated the market 
such MaxMind who offers the robust and regularly updated GeoIP Database. See ' 
Ma:x:Mind's IP Intelligence Solution, MAXMIND.COM, 
http://www.maxmind.com/app/ip-locate (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); cf. Randall 
~unroe, GeoIP, X_KCD.COM, http://xkcd.com/713 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (provid-
mg a humorous spm on how the GeoIP database can be used to create hyper-local 
advertisements). 
153 IPINFoDB, http://ipinfodb.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (follow the "IP 
L_o~ation API" hyperlink); see also GEOPLUGIN, http://www.geoplugin.com (last 
vlSlted Nov. 13, 2011). 
154 IP lNFoDB supra note 153 (follow the "Block IP by Country" hyperlink). 
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on previous media.155 Geolocation provides the Court with the answer. 
Purveyors of prurient publications can presently employ powerful 
tools to publish their products into predetermined precincts. And al-
though not yet fully capable of granular targeting at the street or house 
level, geotargeting is capable of targeting particular cities and zip 
d d . 1 . . 156 co es, an 1s constant y 1mprovmg. 
Some commentators have postulated that geolocation software 
may already be accurate enough for legal purposes.157 There are ways 
to fool geolocation software, 158 but for the first time since Ashcroft I, 
it is possible for web publishers such as Paul Little (a.k.a. Max Hard-
core) to deliberately target those communities tolerant of violent and 
extreme pornography, and avoid publishing in communities that find 
such content obscene. Already, at least one foreign country and one 
state legislature have considered using geolocation to regulate online 
content.159 
C. A Proposal to Use Local Community Standards to Gauge 
Online Obscenity, Justified by Geotargeting 
As the fusion of geography with the Internet becomes more and 
more complete, the Court will be able to comfortably apply the rea-
soning it applied in traditional obscenity law. Specifically, instead of 
using a national standard that is hard to determine, and imposes too 
many burdens on free speech, a local standard should be used to de-
termine obscenity on the Internet. As noted in Miller, using local 
155 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 571, 573 (2002); United States v. Little, 
365 F. App'x 159, 163 (1 lth Cir. 2010); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 
1252 (9th Cir. 2009). 
156 See Digital Element Finding Demand for Granular IP Targeting Says Co-
Founder Friedman, .ADEXHANGER.COM (Aug. 20, 2009, 10:07 AM), 
http://www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/digital-element-rob-friedman-ip-
targetinng/ (stating that early requests for IP targeting were only at the country level, 
but recent developments are making targeting as granular as cities or even zip codes 
possible, creating a "hyperlocal" experience); see, e.g., Bamba Gueye et al., Con-
straint-Based Geolocation of Internet Hosts, 14 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON 
NETWORKING 1219 (2006), available at http://www.slac.stanford.edu/comp/net/wan-
mon/tulip (search that webpage for "December 2006"; then follow the "Constraint-
Based Geolocation of Internet Hosts" link on that line; then follow the full-text "Pdf' 
link) (detailing a new approach that improves upon traditional landmark-based geolo-
cation techniques by using multiple landmarks to triangulate Internet hosts); see also 
Blyth, supra note 147. 
157 Svantesson, supra note 142 at 101-102. 
158 See Nelson, supra note 148, at 1214-15; King, supra note 146, at 71. 
159 Jason Krause, It's Location, Location ... Some Consider Geo location 
Technology a Way to Settle Internet Disputes, 91 A.B.A. J. 18 (2005) (reporting that 
France and Pennsylvania have considered using geolocation to enforce local laws). 
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on previous media. 155 Geolocation provides the Court with the answer. 
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soning it applied in traditional obscenity law. Specifically, instead of 
using a national standard that is hard to determine, and imposes too 
many burdens on free speech, a local standard should be used to de-
termine obscenity on the Internet. As noted in Miller, using local 
155 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 571, 573 (2002); United States v. Little, 
365 F. App'x 159, 163 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 
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156 See Digital Element Finding Demand for Granular IP Targeting Says Co-
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http://www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/digital-element-rob-friedman-ip-
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standards is preferable to using national standards; and through the 
use of technologies such as geotargeting, Internet publishers now have 
the ability to control the geographic areas where they want to publish, 
giving them the ability to publish online without risking the heckler's 
veto wielded by the most conservative of communities. 
One dilemma associated with allowing the use of local standards 
on the Internet is how the Court will deal with "eavesdroppers." In 
other words, when a user in an area where the publisher did not intend 
to publish uses spoofing or proxy methods to work-around the geolo-
cation software and downloads the obscene material in a jurisdiction 
where the publisher did not intend to distribute material. In such 
cases, a modification of the Miller criteria would absolve the pub-
lisher of criminal liability. Instead of allowing all downloads to attach 
liability to the publishers, only those downloads that were (1) intended 
for that geographic area, as evidenced by the publisher's use of geo-
targeting software, or (2) explicitly or implicitly encouraged by the 
publisher, as evidenced by the usual forms of inducement evidence, 
could give rise to liability. Thus, the publishers would only liable 
when they direct their work at an area, or through their actions or ex-
pressions, deliberately manipulate someone into downloading content 
into a restricted geographic area. Under that modified standard, if the 
recipient eavesdrops and purposely circumvents a publisher's geotar-
geting software, such as through proxies or mirrors, then the publisher 
cannot be liable since he never intended to enter that geographic area. 
In essence, a publisher whose material was unilaterally taken into an 
unintended jurisdiction by a third party could not be held liable for 
distributing obscenity because that state or region would not have 
jurisdiction over the publisher. 160 
This provides local communities some degree of autonomy and 
control over what online content will be allowed in their communities 
Gust as they currently have in traditional media), and avoids the uni-
formity of a national standard which would force conservative com-
munities to protect otherwise obscene works; and more importantly, 
allows the expression of free speech of borderline obscene material in 
communities where it is tolerated, preventing the most prudish com-
munity from exercising a heckler's veto power over the Internet. 
Thus, due to the widespread and pervasive use of geotargeting, 
online publishers can be required to target the geographic areas in 
which they wish to publish or face criminal consequences, which is 
the same requirement as in other traditional media. The one exception 
to this rule is that if the recipient takes affirmative steps to circumvent 
160 Svantesson, supra note 142 at 103-04. 
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the geotargeting controls, the publisher would not be liable so long as 
he did not encourage circumvention. This prevents the Court from 
going down a medium-specific analysis and instead uses the same 
standard for all media. This proposed modified standard could be 
similarly extended into any future media, so long as there is some 
geographic control wielded by the publisher. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Obscenity, which is ever blasphemy against the divine beauty in 
life ... is a monster for which the corruption of society forever brings 
forth new food, which it devours in secret. 161 
- Percy Bysshe Shelley 
The law governing online obscenity is at a crossroads. For many 
years traditional obscenity law used the standards of the local com-
munity to determine whether a published work was obscene, requiring 
publishers of extreme content to target only the most tolerant of com-
munities. But the Internet's global reach and open infrastructure 
caused the Court to doubt the applicability of obscenity law to online 
content, causing lower courts to split over whether the same local 
standards should be used (such as the Eleventh Circuit in Little), or 
whether a new national standard for obscenity should be used (such as 
the Ninth Circuit in Kilbride). Geotargeting technology provides the 
answer to the conundrum, giving publishers the same power to target 
audiences as they had in the traditional media, thereby giving the 
Court reason to reapply local standards to all content, be it traditional 
or online media. 
This all begs the question: if geotargeting is such a neat solution 
for the community standards debate, when will the Court address the 
issue? It likely won't be through Kilbride or Little, because both cases 
were decided on harmless error grounds.162 But, eventually the Court 
will once again be asked which standard should be used for online 
content. And as geotargeting technology continues to improve and be 
used more widely, the Court will have a great reason to resolve the 
issue in favor of using local standards to determine obscenity on the 
161 PERCY BY SS HE SHELLEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY AND OTHER ESSAYS 34 
(Kessinger Publishing 2004) (1891). 
162 See Eugene Volokh, Eleventh Circuit Rejects Ninth Circuit's National-
Standard-for-Internet-Obscenity Decision, VOLOKH.COM (Feb. 4, 2010, 12:22 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/02/04/ eleventh-circuit-rejects-ninth-circuits-national-
standard-for-internet-obscenity-decision/. 
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Internet. Ultimately, in the battle between the two standards "there 
can be only one."163 ' 
163 CF 
:1· HIGHLANDER, (Thom EMI Screen Entm't & Highlander Prod Ltd 
1986), trailer available at · · 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSZOgxh2ZKQ&#t=lm53s (last visited Nov 13 
2011). . , 
THE WARRANTLESS USE OF GPS 
TRACKING DEVICES: 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
RESTORED THROUGH APPLICATION 
OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
David Myers * 
INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement's use of Global Positioning System (GPS) de-
vices continues to expand as the technology gains recognition as an 
efficient, accurate, and inexpensive method to monitor a suspect' s 
public movement in automobiles.1 Federal courts have generally up-
held the warrantless use of these devices and determined they do not 
infringe an individual's Fourth Amendment right to a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy".2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, however, has recently held that the warrantless use 
of GPS devices to monitor vehicle movements on public roads is 
unlawful when used over a prolonged period.3 The D.C. Circuit based 
this holding on the belief that long term GPS tracking reveals "the 
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